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GLASS CEILING OR SLIPPERY FLOOR? GENDER AND PROMOTIONS IN IT FIRMS 
ABSTRACT 
The shaky ascent of women up the organizational ladder is a critical factor that contributes to the lack of 
women in IT. In this study, we examine the effect of gender on the likelihood of employee promotions. We 
also examine whether women get an equal lift in promotion likelihood from performance improvements as 
men. We analyze archival promotions, demographic, human capital, and administrative data for 7004 
employees from 2002-2007 for multiple levels of promotions. We develop robust econometric models that 
consider employee heterogeneity to identify the differential effect of gender and performance on promotions. 
We find that contrary to expectations, women are more likely to be promoted, on average. However, looking 
deeper into the heterogeneous main effects using hierarchical Bayesian modeling reveals more nuanced 
insights. We find that, ceteris paribus, they realize less benefit from performance gains than men, less benefit 
from tenure within the focal firm, but more benefit from training than men. This is suggestive of covert 
rather than overt discrimination against women who have to rely on passive approaches, such as signaling via 
training, to restore parity in promotions. We find that the effect of gender and performance varies with the 
level of employee promotion; although not as much as men, women benefit more from performance gains at 
higher organizational levels. Our findings suggest several actionable managerial insights that can potentially 
make IT firms more inclusive and attractive to women. 
 
Key words: Gender, Women in IT, IT Human Capital, Performance, Training, Promotions, IT Services 
Industry 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
“Wanted: More women in technology” (Sprague 2015) 
The motivation of this study is the observation that women make up 57% of the US labor market (DoL 
Report 2015b), yet they only make up 23.1% of computer and information technology (IT) occupations (DoL 
Report 2015a). These inequitable trends echo across global IT firms (McGregor 2014, Woetzel et al. 2015);1 
recent reports even suggest that the number of women in IT jobs has been dropping significantly (Sherman 
2015). While gender inequalities in labor market participation are large and globally persistent (ILO Report 
2014), the glaring underrepresentation of women in the IT industry makes the glass ceiling seem particularly 
pertinent to technology firms (Ahuja 2002, Vara 2014, MacMilan 2012).  
Gender equality is desirable not just from humanitarian but also from economic perspectives.2 
Reducing gender disparity by recruiting and retaining more women employees, especially for the IT industry 
where women are severely underrepresented, positively affects top line growth (McKinsey Report 2015). 
Despite the obvious benefits of gender parity, several social and structural barriers impede women in 
advancing their careers within the IT industry (Ahuja 2002). In particular, the lack of female role models 
and/or mentors in managerial ranks has emerged as one of the critical factors endemic to IT organizations. 
More women are earning STEM degrees, yet many do not opt for IT as a career because they do not find 
women rising to the top echelons of IT firms or even having successful careers in IT (Mundy 2017). Thus, 
the lack of women in leadership positions affects not only the inflow of women into IT but also their career 
growth prospects (Ahuja 2002). The conspicuous dearth of women in technology and leadership roles has 
been decried in both academic literature (e.g., Trauth et al., 2009) and popular press (Mundy 2017, Vara 
2014). Yet, little systematic research has focused on identifying how women rise in IT organizations. In this 
study, we examine how gender affects the likelihood of promotions in the context of the IT industry. 
                                                   
1 A diversity report released by Google in 2014 indicates that only 30% of its employees are women; in technical jobs, 
the search giant employs only 17% women (McGregor 2014). 
2 A recent OECD report finds that parity between men and women in labor markets in developed countries is expected 
to increase their GDP by 12 percent by 2030 (OECD Report 2012). Gender disparity is even more acute in Asia, and 
particularly so in India. If India and China matched the gender parity existent in Singapore, the incremental gains in 
GDP are to the tune of $ 3.2 trillion (Woetzel et al. 2015). 
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Prior literature suggests that promotions are non-wage incentives aimed at identifying and retaining 
high-ability employees (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Firms typically reward good performance with promotions 
(e.g. Gibbons and Waldman 1999a, Prendergast 1993, DeVaro 2006a, Melero 2010), such that, promotions 
mimic tournaments in an organization’s internal labor market (DeVaro 2006a, b, Lazear 1992). If promotions 
are arguably driven by employee performance, does the lack of women in higher echelons of IT firms indicate 
that they are less effective than men? While this strand of research has examined the role of performance on 
promotions, it is only now that a systematic examination of the interplay between gender and performance on 
promotions has begun. This examination is especially important to the IT industry in which tasks such as 
programming, analysis and design, testing, and project management are seen as “masculine” tasks (Chan and 
Wang 2017, Trauth et al. 2004, 2010) and women as the archetypal outgroup (Ahuja 2002, Mundy 2017, 
Trauth et al. 2005, Vara 2014). Thus, to understand the pertinent mechanisms affecting promotions, we further 
examine whether men and women gain similarly from performance improvements in determining promotions. To date, firms 
have incorporated egalitarian policies that ostensibly prevent discriminatory practices, yet women in IT 
continue to be visibly absent, and especially so as we move up the organizational ladder. Our research aims to 
comprehensively identify the role and extent of prejudicial ascriptive biases in the IT work environment that 
preclude successful careers for women in IT. 
Extant research has sought to understand differential labor market outcomes between men and 
women in hiring, promotions, and wage differences. In particular, research on gender-based discrimination 
has extensively focused on hiring decisions and wage inequality (Booth 2009, Booth et al. 2003), real or 
perceived gender differences in competitiveness (Buser et al. 2014, Croson and Gneezy 2009), or 
organizational constraints (Ahuja 2002, Ibarra 1997, Ibarra and Andrews 2015, Trauth et al. 2009), yet 
discrimination in promotion decisions remains under researched (DeVaro et al. 2007, Sheridan et al. 1997). 
The current literature that assesses how employee gender and performance affect promotion remains tenuous 
when it comes to empirical validation (Sheridan et al. 1997); furthermore, it is unclear whether these findings 
directly translate to the IT industry where women constitute less than 25% of the IT workforce and rarely rise 
to influential managerial positions, and may be perceived as violating the traditional gender roles by pursuing 
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masculine careers (Chan and Wang 2017, Trauth et al. 2004, 2010), thereby meriting a closer examination. 
Finally, prior literature may also be constrained by methodological concerns intrinsic to this problem. Factors 
such as employee motivation and innate capability (Cappelli 2004), or gender based self-selection into jobs 
(Gneezy et al. 2003) may possibly confound the results. Together, these may hinder a more thorough 
understanding of how gender, together with performance, affects promotions of women in IT. 
We address this gap in the literature by analyzing detailed, archival promotions, demographic, and 
human capital data for 7,004 IT professionals from 2002-2007 for multiple levels of promotions. The firm, 
focal in this study, is a leading IT services firm with stellar HR practices that invests heavily in formal 
employee training. Using this detailed individual level dataset and a hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach 
that models heterogeneity of the main effects, we are not only able to parse out the effect of pertinent factors 
such as performance, human capital investments, work experience, and organizational roles, but also how 
they affect the likelihood of promotions for women versus men. 
Surprisingly, at least on the surface, we find women are more likely to be promoted. We also find that 
past performance has a positive impact on the likelihood of promotions but that there are differential returns 
to performance improvements for men and women: women employees are penalized for higher performance. 
Compared to men, all else being equal, women are also less likely to benefit from experience within the 
organization. This is suggestive of the fact that they are more likely to be taken for granted. They are, 
however, more likely to benefit from training, consistent with the literature that suggests that women are less 
likely to have time to nurture influential mentor networks and instead use training as a signaling mechanism, 
enhancing promotion likelihood. Together, our results reveal a nuanced effect of gender, performance, 
experience, formal training, and their interactions on employee promotions.  
We contribute to the growing body of research on gender issues in IT organizations. In particular, 
using revealed preference based individual level administrative data on promotions at multiple levels, our 
finding on the negative interaction between gender and performance or gender and experience points to the 
more covert forms of discrimination against women in IT, complementing previous studies that relied on 
self-reported, survey data (e.g., Hersch and Viscusi 1996, Melero 2010). In not paying attention to such 
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nuanced sources of bias against women in IT, egalitarian HR policies seeking to stem discriminatory practices 
may bear little fruit. Our findings also emphasize the palliative effect of mechanisms such as training on 
women’s promotability, which help women credibly signal their worth to senior management when they may 
be less inclined to lean-in and directly ask for promotions that they feel are due to them.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Gender, Performance, and Promotions  
Conventional wisdom suggests that in a meritocratic organization, ceteris paribus, an increase in employees’ 
performance should increase the likelihood of their promotion, irrespective of their gender. Nevertheless, the 
social science and management literature presents mixed evidence with respect to gender, performance, and 
promotions. For instance, some of this research proposes that once differences between motivation and 
capability are accounted for, women are found to be at least as likely to be promoted (Lewis 1986, Booth et 
al. 2003, Buchan et al. 2008). In particular, Lewis (1986) analyzed data for 10,000-12,000 federal employees in 
white-collar jobs but found that no significant differences between the promotion probabilities for men and 
women, once the demographic and occupational attributes were controlled for. In contrast, there is also 
overwhelming evidence that women are penalized more in terms of career growth and that men are more 
likely to be promoted compared to women (Darity Jr. and Mason 1998, Ellingrud et al. 2015, Ibarra et al. 
2010), especially in jobs with “masculine” attributes such as those in IT (e.g., Darity Jr. and Mason 1998, 
Gneezy et al. 2003, Ibarra et al. 2010).  
Although the broader social sciences and management research finds the effect of gender on 
promotions to be ambiguous and therefore an open empirical question, our focus on women in IT paints a 
less rosy picture: these women, in taking on job profiles that have traditionally been considered masculine, 
may not be as likely as men to succeed in such careers (Chan and Wang 2017, Trauth et al. 2004, 2010), 
reflecting taste based, ascriptive discrimination in performance evaluations (Crandall and Eshleman 2003, 
Heilman 2001, Lyness and Heilman 2006, Nieva and Gutek 1980, Wallston and O’Leary 1981)3 and 
                                                   
3 Research has also shown that any performance shortfall on part of men may often be explained away as occuring 
because of adverse work conditions (such as a tough client, risky technology, more competition); however, women 
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promotions (Becker 1971, Darity Jr. and Mason 1998).  Extant research suggests that perception of their 
performance and socio-structural factors impede women’s career in IT organizations. 
In meritocratic organizations, since performance is the single most important factor in promotion 
decisions, we argue that the link between gender and performance-based promotions in the IT industry is 
subtler. While absolute performance is desirable, it is only the relative evaluation of performance that leads to 
promotion for knowledge workers such as those in the IT sector (Rosen 1986, MacCrory et al. 2014). 
Therefore, factors such as preconceived notions of performance or capability (Landau 1995), gender-role 
orientation (Judge and Livingston 2008), and gender-biased evaluations (Heilman 2001, Nieva and Gutek 
1980) may adversely affect relative performance assessment for women in IT and therefore lower the 
likelihood of their promotions.  
In particular, IT tasks such as programming, analysis and design, testing, and project management are 
seen as “masculine” tasks (Chan and Wang 2017, Trauth et al. 2004, 2010). In a male dominated industry 
such as IT, women are the quintessential out-group (Ahuja 2002, Mundy 2017, Trauth et al. 2005, Vara 2014). 
Women in IT are, therefore, more likely to be perceived as violating the traditional gender roles (Baron et al. 
1991, Baron and Bielby 1980, Eagly and Karau 2002, Heilman and Eagly 2008) such that differences in 
economic outcomes like promotions for men versus women cannot be attributed to intrinsic gender 
differences, if any. 
We contend that such gender-role orientation (Judge and Livingston 2008, Unger 1976) for women 
in IT may engender prejudicial behavior on part of the supervisors (Choi et al. 2014, Crandall and Eshleman 
2003, Verniers and Vala 2018). Furthermore, organizations that claim to be meritocratic may also suffer from 
the paradox of meritocracy (Castilla and Benard 2010) that ironically result in lower promotion likelihoods for 
women in IT. Castilla and Benard (2010) suggest that such structural biases may arise because claiming to be a 
meritocratic organization could merely be a symbolic gesture adopted for gaining legitimacy (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977) but not actually implemented (Edelman 1992). It could also be that senior managers in such 
                                                   
are more likely to be subjected to harsher criticism and blamed for their inadequate capabilities resulting in 
performance shortfalls rather than any unfavorable work environment (Park and Westphal 2013). 
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“meritocratic” organizations may paradoxically believe themselves to be unbiased and thus having moral 
credentials (Choi et al. 2014, Monin and Miller 2001) or being personally objective and therefore unbiased 
(Castilla and Benard 2010, Uhlmann and Cohen 2007). In such a scenario, they are less likely to closely 
examine their own motivation and biases, and feel justified in expressing their ingrained prejudices (Choi et al. 
2014, Crandall and Eshleman 2003) in lowering women’s chances of promotions in IT organizations.  
Given these prejudicial biases as well as the existing socio-cultural and structural barriers, we expect women 
to be at a disadvantage when advancing their careers in the IT industry. We posit: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, women are less likely to be promoted than men. 
The impact of both performance and gender on the likelihood of promotions is clearly understood, it is less 
clear whether men and women derive commensurate benefits from performance gains. We now elucidate the 
more nuanced narrative of whether women are penalized or rewarded for better performance, compared to 
men. Milgrom and Oster (1987) examine promotions through the lens of discrimination in labor markets and 
propose the invisibility hypothesis. In a typical organizational context, although there is uncertainty about the 
productivity of new employees, it gets resolved over time as firms learn more about these employees’ abilities 
and productivity. However, it is likely that this uncertainty persists in the external labor market. Because more 
productive employees are promoted earlier, one way in which other firms can gauge the productivity of an IT 
employee is through promotions (DeVaro and Waldman 2012, Waldman 1984). Milgrom and Oster (1987) 
extend this argument to suggest that the normative employee is more visible in that his ability is publicly 
known, whereas the out-group employee is invisible as her ability is not known ex-ante. Therefore, women 
being the IT minority, are perceived to be lacking IT capabilities or simply deemed incompetent (Weinberger 
2006). This invisibility could arise because of prejudice, more because of such misconceptions rather than 
antagonism for women, or the consistent presence of old boys club in IT firms that deems the productivity of 
male IT employees to be more visible (Morgan et al. 2004). Milgrom and Oster (1987) propose when a high 
ability invisible employee is promoted, the external labor market more accurately perceives her ability, and she 
becomes more desirable to other firms, making it difficult to retain her without raising her wages. Even for 
organizations with merit centric policies of promotion and evaluation, this is not a salubrious situation. As a 
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result, to deter poaching and to prevent wage hikes, the dominant strategy for the current employer would be 
to not promote women (the invisible employee) of high ability.  
Research on discrimination against out-groups presents an alternate explanation for why women are 
unlikely to realize gains similar to men from performance evaluations in being promoted: compensatory stereotype 
(Carton and Rosette 2011, Igbaria and Baroudi 1995). This theory suggests that managers engage in goal-
based stereotyping by rationalizing that women (but not men) fail because of negative attributes and succeed 
because of positive attributes other than capabilities (i.e., compensatory stereotypes). Consider the previous 
discussion that women in IT are not expected to be as successful as men in executing masculine tasks such as 
programing and analysis. When they are unsuccessful in these tasks, managers explain it to be because they 
are after all, women in IT and therefore could not be expected to be accomplish such masculine tasks. 
However, when women in IT are successful and perform well at their tasks, it violates these managers’ gender-
role expectations. In such a case, occupational minorities such as women in IT are thought to have 
compensatory attributes that may explain high performance. Managers may be less likely to attribute the 
female employee’s performance to their domain expertise, or technical and analytical capabilities (capabilities 
that are typically valuable in an IT employee), but instead, attribute it luck or other external factors such their 
people skills, their ability to work with various stakeholders, or their “warmth” (Carton and Rosette 2011, 
Igbaria and Baroudi 1995, Yzerbyt et al. 2005). To sum, differences in what the performance is attributed to: 
ability and skills for men versus luck and external factors for women is likely to affect women’s promotability. 
We thus posit that:  
H2: Women and men experience differential outcomes from performance improvements in lifting promotion likelihood, such that 
compared to men, women gain less from performance improvements. 
RESEARCH SETTING AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Research Setting 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we conducted an extensive, in-depth field study at a leading IT services vendor 
headquartered in Bangalore, India. We collaborated and connected with the senior management at the 
company to enable this research. We held interviews with managers responsible for human resources (HR) 
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practices such as promotions as well as employees’ learning and development in order to understand the 
firm’s promotion policies, organizational dynamics, and performance evaluation processes.  
The firm employed around 70,000 people at the time of data collection, since then it has grown to 
around 160,000 employees. The gender ratio of women versus men within the firm is similar to many global 
IT firms, around 23:77 (DoL Report 2015a, Woetzel et al. 2015); this ratio persists to date. The majority of 
the projects delivered by the company adapt the waterfall methodology for software production, such that 
there are distinct phases for design, analysis, programming, testing and implementation (Royce 1970). 
Dedicated project teams deliver these software projects. The typical career path at this firm reflects this, such 
that an employee progresses along the corporate hierarchy from being software engineer to programmer 
analyst to project manager and further on. Our discussions with the senior management at the focal firm 
suggested that we focus our analysis to these three categories for the following reasons: (i), these three rungs 
constitute the largest layer of the employee pyramid, and (ii) these three categories are most critical to human 
capital development and directly responsible for the success and failure of various projects.4 We detail their 
roles and expectations in Appendix’s section A.1: 
The focal firm follows industry best practices to objectively evaluate adequate performance. To that 
end, the firm ensures that it has a meticulous performance evaluation process in place. Our interviews 
revealed that the firm was particularly sensitive to innate gender biases within IT industry and Indian society. 
To help with as unbiased a review as possible, the firm uses a “360 degree feedback” system to measure the 
employee performance annually instead of relying just on a supervisor provided rating. The employee 
performance evaluation considers how well an employee accomplished specific project oriented tasks, 
performance consistency, complexity of the work environment, and adherence to firm values. This elaborate 
metric incorporates feedback from multiple stakeholders that an employee transacts with, such as team 
members, peers, subordinates, and supervisors, thereby providing a comprehensive performance evaluation 
                                                   
4 From this study’s perspective, these are the formative rungs and it is important to examine concomitant biases at these 
early career stages when these can potentially be fixed; these biases may exacerbate or confounded at later career stages 
(Gneezy et al. 2003). 
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(see also Bapna et al. 2013). To provide adequate incentive for its employees to improve their performance, 
the firm uses this performance metric to inform employees’ annual raises.  
Data and Measurement 
We collected detailed archival data on 7004 employees for the years 2002-2007; these employees were 
randomly selected from the SE/PA/PM employee categories and represent an adequate sample from about 
70,000 total firm employees. We were able to get access to data on an employee’s current and previous role 
(e.g., SE or PA or PM), annual performance ratings, and other pertinent attributes such as the employee’s 
gender, work experience in years (both at the focal company and the total work experience), time in current 
role, and complete training records. We describe these data below, Table 1 provides the summary statistics 
for our data for the overall sample as well as for the male and female subsamples. 
Promotion: We were able to impute whether and when an employee has been promoted by comparing their last 
and current role. We code the promotion variable as 1 if we observe the employee being promoted in a 
particular year, and 0 otherwise. We observe two levels of promotions: software engineer (SE) to programmer 
analyst (PA), and programmer analyst to project manager (PM). In our sample, we observe each employee 
being promoted at most once. In our dataset, we observe 24.77% employees being promoted; 26.26% were 
promoted from SE to PA, and 21.43% were promoted from PA to PM.  
Female: The variable Female is the dummy variable indicating the employee’s gender. This variable is coded as 
1 if the employee is female and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows that there are around 23.4% women in our 
sample. 
Employee Performance Rating: Each year, the performance evaluation process scores each employee relative to 
others to yield a relative performance rating. This rating is on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating the highest 
performance level where employee exceeds expectations, and 4 the lowest where the employee did not meet 
expectations. Because of the meticulous and comprehensive nature of the evaluation, we assume that these 
ratings truly capture relative employee performance (Bapna et al. 2013). Furthermore, because a rating of 1 is 
better than a rating of 4, any increase in this rating indicates a decrease in employee performance. In order to 
interpret the coefficients with ease, we use PerfRating (computed as -1*Employee Rating) in our analysis 
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(Langer et al. 2014). As Table 1 shows, the average performance rating is -1.776. The average performance 
rating for women is -1.845, and the average performance rating for men is -1.755.5  
Experience: Prior literature suggests that performance, promotions, and experience are correlated (Joseph et al. 
2015). Furthermore, it is possible that the employees who have been longer with the firm are considered 
more valuable (Slaughter et al. 2007). Hence, we control for an employee’s total (TotalExp) and firm level 
experience (FirmExp); the average experience is 6.14 years and the average firm experience is 4.31 years. This 
varies across men and women: men have an average work experience of 6.26 years compared to 5.76 for 
women, and have an average firm specific experience of 4.33 years compared to 4.22 for women. 
PriorTraining: Our data include detailed information on the courses that each employee took. These data 
included the course name and a short description, the year the course was taken, etc. These course were 
labeled by their type, whether they contained with content related to domain, technology, behavioral, firm 
level processes, or to project management methodologies. To compute the training variable, we sum the total 
number of courses taken by an employee prior to promotion, normalized by the course duration. We find 
that 27.48% of employees took some training. We examine whether women or men take more training. The 
t-statistic is -0.112, with 47506 degrees of freedom; the corresponding p-value is 0.911, showing that women 
and men take statistically the same amount of training.6  
Subsamples: Because we want to isolate the relationship between gender and promotions, we use the 
detailed demographic data to construct sub-samples for our analyses using gender. These subsamples allow us 
to validate both the hypotheses and are useful in analyzing the nuanced relationship between gender, 
performance, and promotions.  
                                                   
5 The t-statistic assuming equal variances is 8.569 with 27630 degrees of freedom, yielding a p-value < 0.0001, indicating 
that men’s ratings are slightly better than those of women.  
6 A probit model estimating the propensity to take training shows the coefficient for Female is insignificant, thus there are 
no differences between women and men in their propensity to take training. The results for this regression are available 
from authors upon request. 
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Table 1 describes our variables and provides the summary statistics. The correlation matrix between the 
dependent and explanatory variables is provided in Table 2. We standardized the relevant variables prior to 
our analysis to ease interpretation as well as to assuage any collinearity concerns (Aiken and West 1991).  
<<Insert tables 1 and 2 about here>> 
Methodology 
The descriptive statistics provided in table 1 suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in our sample.7 
Employee performance as well as experience attributes differ across gender, across laterals and direct hires, 
and across roles. For instance, consider the inherent hierarchy in the organization, where a policy of merit-
based promotions portends that competition gets tougher going forward, therefore an employee’s current 
role may moderate the effect of performance on promotion decisions. Likewise, direct hires, in comparison 
to lateral hires, may manifest specific human capital that is more desirable to senior management, this may in 
turn moderate the effect of performance and hence on promotion likelihood (Becker 2003, Slaughter et al. 
2007). Any examination of the drivers of promotions that does not take into account such intrinsic 
differences in employees would yield biased coefficient estimates (Gonul and Srinivasan 1993, Venkatesan et 
al. 2007). These in turn would lead to senior management making inferior promotion decisions and 
implementing suboptimal policies (Allenby and Rossi 1998). Accordingly, we model heterogeneity explicitly in 
our analysis using a hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach.  
Our dependent variable is binary; we estimate the following binary logit model to confirm our 
hypotheses. The primary explanatory variables that inform our model in estimating the likelihood of 
employees’ promotions are their performance and gender; allowing us to validate H1. In addition, we include 
firm and total experience as pertinent factors: 𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ = 𝛽.) + 𝛽0). 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔),(+80) + 𝛽:). 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽=). 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝),+ + 𝛽A). 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝),+ + 𝜀),+ , (1) 
                                                   
7 For the sake of brevity, we only report the descriptive statistics for overall sample and across men v. women in Table 1. 
We are happy to provide these statistics for different subsamples, such as across direct v. laterals, or across different 
roles on request. 
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where 𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ = 1	𝑖𝑓	𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+∗ > 0;	𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ = 0 otherwise. Thus, the likelihood of 
promotions can be shown to be 
PrL𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ = 1M = exp	[𝑥)R. 𝛽)] 1 + exp	[𝑥)R. 𝛽)]T  (2) 
In the above equations 1 and 2, ‘i’ is each employee and ‘t’ is the year. GotPromotioni,t is 1 if an employee ‘i’ is 
promoted in year t, and 0 otherwise, Female is a dummy variable indicating whether the employee is female 
(Female=1) or male (Female=0). Because promotions depend on how the employee has performed in the 
previous year, we use PerfRatingi,(t-1), the lagged variable capturing employee performance for the year (t-1). 
Finally, variables FirmExpi,t and TotalExpi,t are the firm level experience and total experience of the employee 
‘i’ at time ‘t.’ We assume the error terms εi,t to be standard Type I extreme value distribution. In the above 
model, PerfRatingi,(t-1) is in particular useful because it encapsulates the effect of prior performance on the 
likelihood of promotion and hence subsumes some of the unobservable factors (both time-invariant and 
time-varying) in the panel model, such as an employee’s capability, inherent drive, and task specificity within a 
project (Bapna et al. 2013). We use the simplified notation 𝛽)R = [𝛽.)	𝛽0)	𝛽:) 	𝛽=)	𝛽A)] such that 𝛽)R denotes all 
the coefficients in our model that affect the likelihood of an employee’s promotion.  
We assume that the employees within the firm vary along the following attributes: whether they were hired 
directly or were a lateral hire, training they took prior to promotion, and where they were in the 
organizational hierarchy (whether a software engineer, an analyst, or a project manager). To understand the 
nuances of this heterogeneity on the model parameters, we estimate a continuous employee heterogeneity 
model in which we allow the coefficients to be employee specific, as shown in equation 3: 𝛽) = 𝛿. + 𝛿0. 𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒) + 𝛿:. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) + 𝛿=.𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒) +	𝜈),	 (3)	
where 𝜈)~𝑖𝑖𝑑	𝑁L0, 𝑉aM The hierarchical relationship shown in equations 1-3 indicates that 𝛽)R can be thought 
of as a function of the three observable employee attributes and allows us to examine the effect of 
heterogeneity on our model parameters. Denoting Δ = [𝛿.	𝛿0	𝛿:	𝛿=], this hierarchical relationship is: 
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Thus, 𝛽)R becomes a function of the three observable employee attributes and allows us to examine the effect 
of heterogeneity on our model parameters; the variables d1, d2, and d3 in D specify how DirectHirei, 
PriorTrainingi, and LastRolei affect the parameters specified in equations 1 and 2. As an example to illustrate 
this, β1i measures the effect of performance on promotions for employee ‘i.’ Furthermore, the effect of 
DirectHirei on β1i denotes the differential impact of past performance rating on the likelihood of promotion 
for direct v. lateral hires. Thus, if β1i <0 and d1 <0, a lower performance rating lowers the likelihood of 
promotions, and this effect is greater for direct hires as compared to laterals.  
In equation 3, the random variable ni is the unobservable error component of the employer 
heterogeneity, which we assume to be distributed normally with mean 0 and variance covariance matrix Vβ. 
The model specification in equations 1-3 is quite appealing as it allows us to estimate individual level 
coefficients that in turn allow us to evaluate the precise effect of various employee attributes on promotions. 
That is, the hierarchical specification allows us to understand the moderation effect of direct hires, 
organizational roles, and prior training on performance, gender, and experience in a more nuanced manner.  
We use the hierarchical Bayesian inference process to help with the computation intensity typical with such 
models (Rossi et al. 2005).8 In particular, we use standard techniques used in estimating Bayesian inference 
models: we set diffuse priors for the model parameters, and then apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods using a Gibbs sampler for data augmentation. Specifically, this semi-parametric approach involves 
draws from the Inverse-Wishart distribution in the Gibbs Sampler. We run the MCMC simulation for 50,000 
draws, and only use the last 30,000, discarding the first 20,000 as burn-in. This exercise follows the guidelines 
about the convergence of the posterior distribution; figure 1 illustrates the likelihood convergence. In 
addition to this, we deploy the standard practice of using a thinning parameter of 20 – that is we retain every 
20th draw of the posterior distribution – this helps to reduce the associated storage and computational burden 
                                                   
8 Estimation using Bayesian inference techniques can be more parsimonious in its data requirements as the estimation 
procedure is able to partially pool data across observations and thus present more information that can help estimate the 
individual-specific parameters (Allenby and Rossi 1998, Rossi et al. 2005). Allenby and Rossi (1998) offer more 
discussion on the appeal and constraints of Bayesian inference.  
 14 
for the simulation. The mean rejection rate for the Metropolis-Hasting (MH) algorithm is 0.79; the desired 
rejection rate is 0.6–0.9.  
Subsample Analysis: In addition to examining the effect of employee attributes on our sample, we are 
interested in understanding if the effect of the model coefficients varies between men and women, and 
whether men and women have differential returns to performance improvements in increasing promotion 
likelihood. Therefore, to validate H2, we analyze equations 1-3 for different subsamples constructed based on 
employee gender, omitting the variable Femalei in equations 1 and 2 from the subsample analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 reports the population level parameter estimates (𝛽.ccc	𝛽0ccc	𝛽:ccc	𝛽=ccc	𝛽Accc) for equations 1 and 2. Contrary to 
our expectations, the positive coefficient for Female (𝛽:ccc= 0.209, p<0.01) indicates that women are, on average, 
more likely to be promoted. While this result may seem counter-intuitive to our hypothesis, several alternate 
explanations emerge when we take a deeper perspective: First, consider the widely recognized wage 
differential between men and women (Babcock and Laschever 2003, HBR Spotlight 2013, Leibbrandt and 
List 2015). Booth et al. (2003) explain that women are more likely to be promoted because they are a “lower 
cost option” compared to men for the task that needs to be performed at the higher organizational level. 
Second, in more recent research examining gender, trust, and helpfulness, women are found to be more 
helpful and trustworthy compared to men (see Orbell et al. 1994, Buchan et al. 2008). Hence, as employees 
move to more responsible roles that require increased interactions with various stakeholders (PA compared 
to SE and PM compared to PA), it is likely that women are perceived to be a better fit. Third, it is also 
possible that these women are being promoted to a glass cliff, anchoring projects destined to fail 
(Bruckmüller et al. 2014, Cook and Glass 2014). Fourth, policies and processes implemented at the 
organizational level that increase transparency and accountability from managers potentially reduced overt 
biases against women in IT (Castilla 2008, Lerner and Tetlock 1999, Uhlmann and Cohen 2007). Together, 
these may explain why women are more likely to be promoted and why H1 is not supported. 
As expected, the coefficient for past year performance is positive and significant; this result is consistent for 
the overall sample (𝛽0ccc= 1.312, p<0.01) as well as the male (𝛽0ccc= 1.483, p<0.01) and female (𝛽0ccc= 1.243, 
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p<0.01) subsamples. H2 argued that women are likely the invisible employees whose performance is 
unknown compared to the norm, therefore firms have an incentive to not promote high performing women 
to prevent their poaching. Consistent with extant literature (Igbaria and Baroudi 1995), the effect of 
performance on promotion likelihood is smaller for women, supporting H2. Thus, a major nuance of our 
findings is that while on average there seems to be no overt discrimination in promoting women, ceteris 
paribus, the returns to a marginal improvement in performance are lower for women. This is troubling 
evidence of potentially covert discrimination, that looks at similar performance differently based on gender. 
Note all variables are standardized and thus comparing of coefficients representing the identical marginal 
effects, across the gender models is valid, and the difference is statistically significant. 
Our estimates also indicate an interesting effect of experience on promotions. Firm level experience 
is positively associated with the likelihood of promotion (𝛽=ccc= 0.773, p<0.01). Again, this effect is smaller for 
women (𝛽=dccccc= 0.856, p<0.01; 𝛽=eccccc= 0.223, p<0.01), suggesting that spending too long in the same role signals 
missed prior opportunities for promotions for women compared to men. Thus, while firm level experience is 
likely to increase promotion likelihood, it may weaken the case for future promotions for women. Using the 
lens of covert discrimination, the more time women spend within the focal firm, the more they are taken for 
granted and higher is their hurdle to promotion. In contrast, experience outside of the focal firm, which is 
associated with market power and outside options, enhances promotion opportunities, as the total experience 
is positively related to promotion (𝛽Accc= 0.931, p<0.01); we find that women benefit more from total 
experience compared to men (𝛽Adccccc= 0.762, p<0.01; 𝛽Aecccc= 2.081, p<0.01), as they are less taken for granted.  
<<Insert table 3 about here >> 
Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C report the estimation results of the posterior distribution of the hierarchical regression 
coefficients in the equation 3 for the a) overall sample, b) male subsample, and c) female subsample. These 
estimates offer several interesting insights. First, the heterogeneity variables are all positively associated with 
b1, the coefficient measuring the effect of performance gains on promotion likelihood. The reader is advised 
to read across row 1 of Table 4A – 4C to interpret this. We find that intrinsically, performance is positively 
associated with promotion likelihood: d0 is positive and significant for all three analyses. Further, the 
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hierarchical Bayesian model capturing individual level heterogeneity reveals that direct hires benefit more 
from performance gains, prior training is complementary to performance and to women, and those higher up 
in the organizational hierarchy reap more from performance improvements.  
Some of these results speak to the specific human capital that direct hires garner in an organization; 
for the same total work experience, direct hires would have been longer in the focal organization, and more in 
tune with the organizational goals, and their performance accomplishments are more likely to be perceived as 
more valuable to the firm (Becker 2003, Slaughter et al. 2007), leading to the complementary relationship 
between direct hires and performance. Further, the complementary relationship between training and 
performance Becker (1962) suggests that it is likely that employees with superior performance are better able 
to utilize their training into improving future productivity, send stronger signals, or indicate their future 
trainability and hence enhance their chances of a promotion (Spence 1973). The positive coefficients (D) in 
table 4A for performance validate the theoretical predictions of DeVaro and Waldman (2012) and can 
provide precise predictions about the linkage between performance and promotions at the individual and 
cohort level for firms.  
Tables 4B and 4C show how these coefficients differ across men and women. Women intrinsically 
benefit less from performance gains, especially when they are direct hires (d1M = 0.171, p < 0.01; d1F = 0.104, 
p < 0.01) This is again suggestive of the fact that in absence of market power and outside options that go 
along with laterals, women within the company’s hiring and promotion ladder are more likely to be taken for 
granted. This is further reflected in the fact that compared to men, they seem to benefit less from 
performance gains at higher levels (d3M = 0.572, p < 0.01; d3F = 0.405, p < 0.01), suggesting the bar gets 
disproportionately higher with time and tenure for women. There is no clear ex-ante theoretical rationale for 
this. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that even though women do not realize benefits similar to men 
from performance gains, they seem to get more relative benefits from better performance at higher 
organizational levels. An increase of one unit in performance for a women increases the promotion 
probability from 0.390 to 0.637 (an increase of 63.3%, compared to 146.53% for men) at the software 
engineer level, but from 0.017 to 0.066 (an increase of 290.65%, compared to 475.23% for men) at the 
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programmer analyst level. We reasoned that the effect of performance improvement on promotion likelihood 
is lower for women to prevent poaching of the invisible minority (Milgrom and Oster 1987), but our results 
suggest that this effect varies within the organizational hierarchy. While the desire to prevent poaching is still 
a factor, the fit of women’s supposed compensatory attributes such as people and communication skills and 
warmth with the more managerial role of PM manifests in our findings that high performing women are 
penalized less when being promoted to PM than when being promoted to PA (Carton and Rosette 2011, 
Yzerbyt et al. 2005).  
Second, the effect of the heterogeneity variables on b2 is considerably varied, although the intrinsic 
effect (d0) positive for the overall sample, as also evidenced by 𝛽:ccc. Women who are direct hires gain less than 
laterals (d1 = –0.003, p < 0.01); however they gain more from training (d2 = 0.088, p < 0.01). Interestingly, 
selecting into training, a more passive-aggressive form of signaling the desire to improve, learn, and be ready 
to lead is shown to be beneficial to women. As the analysis indicates, they benefit more from training (d2M = 
0.167, p < 0.01; d2F = 0.249, p < 0.01). This effect is augmented in the finding that training enhances the 
effect of firm and total experience for women more than men. As an example, consider the effect of a one 
unit increase in training in the promotion probability for a direct-hire software engineer with average 
performance. For a woman in this position, the promotion probability is increased by 8.53% compared to a 
6.73% increase for a man in this same position. At a higher organizational level (programmer analyst seeking 
to be a project manager), a unit increase in training increases the probability of promotion by 14.51% for the 
female employee compared to 8.14% for a male employee. This is consistent with the literature that suggests 
that women face more time constraints due to family and other obligations (Ahuja 2002, Bianchi et al. 2012, 
Kamp Dush et al. 2018). They are less likely to have time to nurture peer networks that enhance the 
likelihood of promotions. Therefore, women employees identify training as a structured approach to 
advance in their careers as opposed to ad-hoc personal interconnections. Consistent with the logic presented 
above, our results also suggest that training enhances the effect of firm and total experience for women more 
than men, and that this effect gets stronger as women rise up the value chain, indicating the strength of this 
credible signal in getting promotions.  
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<<Insert tables 4A, 4B, and 4C about here >> 
Robustness Checks and Endogeneity:  
Although the employees in our sample were randomly selected, in considering alternate specifications, we need 
to account for potential endogeneity in our model before we ascribe a causal linkage between these variables 
and the likelihood of promotions. The proposed Bayesian inference model is semi-parametric and hence not 
as restrictive as classical inference models in its assumptions of exogeneity, but any alternate specification 
requires instrumental variables to account for endogenous performance or human capital variables.9 To do so, 
we use the following Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond (AB-BB) dynamic panel model (Arellano and Bover 
1995, Blundell and Bond 1998), using robust standard errors: 𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ = 𝛽. + 𝛽0. 𝐺𝑜𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),(+80) +	𝛽:. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔),(+80) + 𝛽=. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔),(+80) + 𝜀),+ (4) 
 
In addition to the lagged dependent variable (GotPromotioni,t), we use past performance and past training as 
explanatory variables (Bapna et al. 2013). The structure of the dynamic panel model is such that we can 
construct instruments using lagged values of our dependent variable, wherein these instruments have been 
shown to be uncorrelated with the error term. Note that this model is unable to account for any time 
invariant variable such as “Female.” We estimate the model specified in equation 4 for the overall sample and 
then separately for the two subsamples for men and women. 
<<Insert table 5 about here >> 
Table 5 presents the results from the dynamic panel specification. Overall, this model suggests that past 
promotion, past performance, and past training investments are positively related to promotion likelihood. 
Examining columns 2 and 3, we find that past promotion is positive and significant for only men, while the 
performance gains are significantly higher for men compared to women. Both these results support our 
                                                   
9 For instance, while gender is exogenous, there is a possibility that performance is endogenous; employee motivation 
and innate drive could influence employee performance. Further, the firm’s commitment to provide incentives such as 
promotions and fair evaluations may attract high performance individuals (Cappelli 2004). Classical econometric models 
mandate that we account for this endogeneity, else we may overestimate the marginal effect of performance on the 
likelihood of promotions. In other words, a naïve probability model would measure the marginal effect not of the 
performance, but rather the combined effect of performance improvement and being identified as an employee who 
improves the marginal performance.  
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previous findings and suggest covert discrimination against women. We also find that women derive better 
bang for the buck from training investments.   
In summary, our overall results indicate that women in IT may not face overt discrimination in 
promotion.10 Indeed, on average, they are more likely to get promoted than men, ceteris paribus. Our current 
analysis is limited in its data to be able to pin down the exact mechanism for this. The literature points out 
that pay differentials could account for some of this; for the same job, women are a cheaper resource for 
profit maximizing firms (Albanesi et al. 2015, Castilla and Benard 2010). Alternatively, it could be linked to 
issues of superior soft skills (Blau and Kahn 2000, Bruckmüller et al. 2014). While future research is needed to 
tease this aspect out, we do have striking evidence of heterogeneity in the gender effect. 
Our findings here are suggestive of covert discrimination (Swim et al. 1995) due to the differential 
returns from performance gains, where in as reasoned by the invisibility hypothesis, the high performing 
women are less likely to be promoted (Milgrom and Oster 1987). Put differently, all else being equal, women 
performing at the same level as men, are less likely to get promoted. Further, all else being equal, women with 
longer tenure in the company are less likely to be promoted. This is strong evidence that are they are taken 
for granted, as the effect flips to a positive sign for women hired from the outside.  
These covert prejudicial tactics against women are somewhat mitigated by them, arguably in a passive 
aggressive fashion, by taking training. Training has a strong positive effect, all else being equal, for women 
seeking an alternative, less-in-your-face-vehicle to climb the promotion ladder. Thus, we argue that human 
capital investments such as training (Acemoglu 1997) may help women provide credible signals to circumvent 
structural impediments in tech firms (Gibbons and Waldman 1999b). Moreover, these signals are relatively 
more amenable to be used by women, who may be less inclined to lean-in and directly ask for promotions 
that they feel are due to them (Ahuja 2002, Ibarra 1992). Our results suggest that training serves as signaling 
                                                   
10 We provide additional robustness checks in the appendix table A.1. We further highlight the importance of 
considering employee level heterogeneity in modeling promotion decisions in the appendix. Appendix Table A.2 
compares the model fitting statistics for these models, that is, the proposed model in equations 1-3 with alternate 
specifications; our proposed model fares better than these competing models, indicating that accounting for employee 
heterogeneity is critical for policy and management decisions.  
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mechanism that helps women circumvent the traditional biases and notions to establish their credentials as 
capable and driven IT employees. As we conclude in the next section, our findings have important 
implications for senior managers as they balance the gender bias and reward employees for performance 
improvements and skills acquisition via promotions. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The dearth of women in IT, well documented by both academia and industry, has been attributed in part to 
the lack of women in the higher echelons of organizational ladder, which not only affects the immediate 
career prospects of women in IT but also dissuades women who want to be part of IT labor markets (Ahuja 
2002). While performance has long been understood to be the primary factor affecting promotions, the 
paucity of granular data has led to only an imperfect understanding of the interplay between gender and 
performance as they affect promotions for women in IT. In this study, we investigate the factors affecting 
women’s rise in IT organizations. Our primary focus is on examining the role of gender on promotions in IT 
firms, but we also examine whether men and women experience differential or commensurate returns from 
performance gains in augmenting promotion likelihood.  
Our study utilizes a unique setting in which to examine this research question – a leading IT services 
provider headquartered in India. At the time of the study, the firm employed close to 70,000 employees and 
made significant investments in processes geared towards fair promotion, training, and evaluation for its 
employees. We gained access to detailed, archival, administrative data on promotions, demographics, 
performance, and training for 7,004 employees from 2002–2007. This comprehensive dataset affords us the 
opportunity to examine not only the effect of gender but also performance for different levels of promotions, 
from software engineer to programmer analyst to project manager and for laterals versus direct hires.  
Our findings reveal that gender is a strong predictor of the likelihood of promotions. Contrary to our 
expectations, we find that women are more likely to be promoted than men. We offer several alternate 
explanations for the pure gender effect revealed in our findings. First, considering the wage differential 
between men and women, we posit that women are more likely to be promoted because they are a “lower 
cost option” compared to men for the task that needs to be performed at the higher level of organizational 
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ladder. Second, recent studies suggest that women might more helpful and trustworthy compared to men. 
Hence, as employees move to more responsible roles that require increased social interactions with various 
stakeholders, it is likely that women are perceived to be a better fit. Such a promotion strategy may also 
reflect glass cliffs, such that women are promoted to be part of failing projects (Cook and Glass 2014). 
Finally, it is possible that equitable organizational policies result in more transparency and accountability from 
managers and reduce blatant biases against women (Castilla 2008, Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Together, these 
factors may explain why women are more likely to be promoted. We also argued that gains from performance 
improvements in increasing promotion likelihood are lower for women. We find that women may be 
penalized for better performance in that their promotion likelihood increases with performance at a lesser 
rate compared to men. Considering that women are an occupational minority in the IT industry, it is likely 
that their competence is not known except to their employer, therefore, the firm has an incentive to not 
promote women with high performance and keep them “hidden” from competing firms (Milgrom and Oster 
1987). It is also possible that senior management may attribute their performance less to ability than to luck, 
and hence women do not gain as much from performance improvements (e.g. Carton and Rosette 2011).  
Further, we find that women benefit disproportionately more from training. While our study does not 
delineate why it may be so, it is possible that women may be more opportunistic when it comes to enrolling 
for courses that ensure faster promotions, or they may imbibe knowledge more effectively and are more 
adept at translating knowledge gains into promotability and/or signaling (Becker 1962, 2003, Stiglitz 1975). 
This allows them to circumvent any social and structural biases that may have otherwise prevented their climb 
up the corporate ladder, leading to promotions. 
We believe that the strength, robustness, consistency, and validity of our findings stem from a) using 
detailed employee data for gender, performance, experience, and training for multiple levels of promotions 
that provides an adequate backdrop to examine the more intricate predictions of theories from economics 
and social sciences, and b) employing robust empirical specifications that addressing the heterogenous 
differences between employees. The validity of our results is reflected in their consistency across different 
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specifications, including those that account for endogenous constructs such as motivation and drive that 
affect performance. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature on IT labor markets in several important ways. First, 
we contribute to research on promotions and tournaments by positioning gender as an important 
determinant of promotions for women in IT. Ours is one of the first studies to unequivocally establish the 
economic significance of performance, outside experience, and training for women in IT seeking promotions. 
In sum, our study draws from and contributes to the labor economics and social sciences literature to provide 
a more nuanced but complete picture of the linkages between gender, relative employee performance, human 
capital investments, and promotions in the context of knowledge workers.  
Our findings also have important implications for senior executives as they manage their human 
capital (Luftman et al. 2009). Prior literature suggests that women lack influential mentor network (e.g., Ibarra 
1993), leading to differences in how women are evaluated and promoted within an organization. Our primary 
managerial implication is that training helps women with low performance by thwarting any structural biases 
that may have otherwise inhibited them, especially at higher levels of promotion, underscoring the 
importance of training as a credible signal of ability and value. Although many IT organizations have 
diligently pursued unbiased evaluation and promotion practices, it is likely that subtle biases persist. Senior 
managers can instill best practices such that women use training as a way to ameliorate any gender issues and 
climb the organizational ladder faster. Further, we find that training and performance are complementary, 
such that training can help employees with high performance rise faster in the organizational hierarchy, this is 
especially . Therefore, managers can nurture the high performing employees and provide them resources to 
excel even more. Further, prior research suggests that fair evaluations and training are exemplary human 
resource practices that affect firm performance positively (Delaney and Huselid 1996). Our study suggests 
that adoption of processes and policies that limit individual manager’s discretion (Elvira and Graham 2002), 
promote transparency and accountability (Castilla 2008, Lerner and Tetlock 1999), and even adequate 
managerial incentives (Sherf et al. 2018) that go beyond symbolic gestures will also help reduce biases against 
women in IT. In essence, such practices create a virtuous cycle; employees witness the value to investing in 
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training to foster their growth within the organization, thereby improving their own and consequently the 
firm’s performance; managers understand that they will be held accountable for biases but will also enjoy 
suitable rewards in being more equitable and fairer. Finally, we note that although focused on IT labor 
markets, the findings of this research are generalizable to women in other male-dominated industries, such as 
those in STEM.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Like all research, this study has limitations and provides opportunities for further research. We rely on critical 
data around three representative positions in the IT services work ladder from a single firm. It is possible that 
the results may not generalize to other firms or to other positions such as that of data analyst or data 
scientists. However, this firm has exemplary HR practices and resembles not only the other top 5 competitors 
within India but also global IT giants such as IBM and Accenture who operate captive centers in India and 
garner close to 80% of the Indian IT services market share. While the growth in this sector portends wider 
appreciation and applicability of our findings and implications (Bartel et al. 2014), we caution the readers that 
our results may not generalize to firms that do not yet have process-oriented HR practices that inhibit overt 
gender biases. Additionally, we are hampered by not having access to wage data, which could offer a more 
comprehensive insight into biases against women in IT. Finally, we note that our data analysis is limited to 
lower levels of promotions. Therefore, our findings may not take into account the risk-loving and competitive 
behavior sought in executive and CXO positions (Gneezy et al. 2003), where many of the gender issues 
surface. It would be interesting to understand how gender, performance, experience, and training dynamics 
change as one examines the higher echelons of the corporate ladder (Powell and Butterfield 1994). 
We hope that future work can utilize wage and promotions data to develop newer insights. For instance, 
future research could examine discrimination against women in IT taking into account societal and country 
level norms. Future research can further examine how factors such as peer and mentor networks impact 
employee promotions.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Data Dictionary and Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Mean (SD) 
Overall        M               F 
Promotion (t) Variable indicating whether promotion occurred in year t 
or not 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.162 
(0.368) 
Female Dummy variable indicating employee's gender (1: 
Female; 0: Male) 
0.234 
(0.424) 
 
 
 
PerfRating The relative performance rating of the employee, this 
ranges from 1 (excellent) to 4 (poor). To ease 
interpretation, we use -1*PerfRating. 
1.776 
(0.734) 
1.755 
(0.734) 
1.845 
(0.730) 
TotalExp An employee's total IT work experience in years. 6.145 
(2.273) 
6.263 
(2.351) 
5.757 
(1.946) 
FirmExp An employee's work experience at the focal firm in years. 4.307 
(2.132) 
4.333 
(2.163) 
4.224 
(2.026) 
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Variable 
Name 
Variable Description Mean (SD) 
Overall        M               F 
PriorTraining The total number of training courses taken by an 
employee prior to promotion, normalized by course 
duration. 
0.669 
(1.003) 
0.652 
(0.993) 
0.726 
(1.104) 
DirectHire Dummy variable indicating whether an employee is a 
direct (from college) or lateral hire (1: Direct; 0: Lateral) 
0.442 
(0.497) 
0.432 
(0.495) 
0.477 
(0.499) 
LastRole Dummy indicating the last role: whether software 
engineer (SE), or programmer analyst (PA), or project 
manager (PM); coded as SE=0, PA=1, PM=2 
1.278 
(0.448) 
1.306 
(0.461) 
1.189 
(0.391) 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Promotion (t)        
2 Female -0.0015       
3 PriorPerfRating 0.0543* 0.0515*      
4 TotalExp 0.0057 -0.0942* 0.2462*     
5 FirmExp 0.0202* -0.0217* 0.1173* 0.2738*    
6 PriorTraining 0.0068 0.0311* -0.0957* -0.2783* 0.0583*   
7 DirectHire 0.0066 0.0386* -0.1097* -0.3828* 0.3595* 0.2944*  
8 LastRole 0.0016 -0.1108* 0.0923* 0.7259* 0.3215* -0.0469* -0.1614* 
Note: * indicates correlations significant at 5% level. 
Table 3: Likelihood of Promotion: Population Level Estimates 
 Coefficient(SE) 
Overall 
Coefficient(SE) 
Male 
Coefficient(SE) 
Female 
Past Year Performance 1.3123** (0.0034) 
1.4834** 
(0.0036) 
1.2434** 
(0.0092) 
Female 0.209** (0.0013)   
Firm Experience 0.7727** (0.0068) 
0.8564** 
(0.0077) 
0.2233** 
(0.0204) 
Experience 0.9310** (0.0105) 
0.7619** 
(0.0108) 
2.0807** 
(0.0404) 
Intercept -1.9352** (0.0129) 
-2.002** 
(0.014) 
-1.3216** 
(0.0374) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 
Table 4A: Likelihood of Promotion: Heterogeneity Estimates for the Overall Sample 
 
Intercept Direct Hire Prior Training Last Role 
Past Year Performance 0.5374** 
(0.001) 
0.1473** 
(0.0005) 
0.1854** 
(0.0003) 
0.4395** 
(0.0007) 
Female 0.2665** 
(0.0015) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.0881** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0957** 
(0.0011) 
Firm Experience 1.8002** 
(0.0012) 
-0.2519** 
(0.0014) 
0.3821** 
(0.0004) 
-0.9293** 
(0.0007) 
Experience -1.6526** 
(0.0015) 
1.0566** 
(0.0016) 
0.3647** 
(0.0005) 
1.3952** 
(0.0009) 
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Intercept Direct Hire Prior Training Last Role 
Intercept 1.1744** 
(0.0009) 
-0.1172** 
(0.001) 
0.0586** 
(0.0003) 
-2.4184** 
(0.0007) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 
Table 4B: Likelihood of Promotion: Heterogeneity Estimates for the Male Subsample 
 Intercept Direct Hire Prior Training Last Role 
Past Year Performance 0.5539**  (0.0013) 
0.1705**  
(0.0008) 
0.1666**  
(0.0004) 
0.5717**  
(0.0009) 
Firm Experience 1.8848**  (0.0018) 
-0.0806**  
(0.0026) 
0.3381**  
(0.0006) 
-0.9462**  
(0.0011) 
Experience -1.5989** (0.0021) 
0.7692**  
(0.0034) 
0.3742**  
(0.0006) 
1.3116**  
(0.0013) 
Intercept 1.0032**  (0.0017) 
-0.2622** 
(0.0017) 
0.0802** 
(0.0005) 
-2.247** 
(0.0014) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 
Table 4C: Likelihood of Promotion: Heterogeneity Estimates for the Female Subsample 
 Intercept Direct Hire Prior Training LastRole 
Past Year Performance 0.5008**  (0.0047) 
0.104**  
(0.0027) 
0.2487**  
(0.0014) 
0.4046**  
(0.0034) 
Firm Experience 1.6568**  (0.0072) 
-1.2186**  
(0.0061) 
0.5518  
(0.002) 
-1.0355** 
(0.0043) 
Experience -2.1628**  (0.0082) 
2.6526**  
(0.0075) 
0.4839** 
(0.0024) 
2.0435**  
(0.005) 
Intercept 2.5344**  (0.006) 
0.633** 
(0.0033) 
0.138** 
(0.0014) 
-3.6142** 
(0.0061) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 
Table 5: Robustness Checks: Dynamic Panel Model 
  Overall Males Females 
Promotion (t-1) 0.0897** 
(0.0274) 
0.1142** 
(0.032) 
0.0094   
(0.0525) 
Past Year 
Performance 
0.4395** 
(0.0157) 
0.4608** 
(0.0187) 
0.3576** 
(0.0278) 
Past Year Training 0.0578** 
(0.0109) 
0.038** 
(0.0129) 
0.129** 
(0.0197) 
Intercept 0.2792** 
(0.0077) 
0.2524** 
(0.2524) 
0.3559** 
(0.0133) 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 2. 
Post estimation Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions failed to reject the null hypothesis (H0) that 
overidentifying restrictions are valid, with Prob > chi2  = 0.228 (overall sample), 0.155 (male subsample), and 
0.834 (female subsample) respectively. 
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Figure 1: Values of the log-likelihood of the hierarchical Bayesian model evaluated at posterior draws 
of individual coefficient estimates show convergence; every 20th draw retained for analysis  
 
  
 A.1 
APPENDIX  
A.1: JOB ROLE DESCRIPTIONS – SOFTWARE ENGINEERS, PROGRAMMER ANALYST, PROJECT 
MANAGER 
The entry-level position in the organization is that of a software engineer (SE). Software engineers help 
code and test the software. They also provide help with implementation and post-production support. To 
accomplish these tasks, they require knowledge of the underlying technology and the programming language 
needed to code, debug, and test the software. They would also need to understand the processes and 
frameworks that the organization uses to ensure quality and timeliness of the software to be delivered.  
The next step on the organizational ladder is that of a programmer analyst (PA). PAs take on more 
analytical and design responsibilities pertinent to software projects that go beyond coding. They interact with 
the clients to determine business requirements, analyze these requirements, and help with software design, 
architecture, and development. They may supervise programmers with code reviews and provide expert 
technical help when needed. They assist PMs in project scoping and effort estimation. PAs may also assist 
with the project’s knowledge management and provide transition support, as the project moves from 
implementation to production. They’d thus need to be cognizant not only with technology but also domain 
and other functional knowledge necessary for a successful project implementation and support. A typical PA 
would have 3 to 8 years of work experience. 
Project Managers (PMs) constitute the next rung in the organizational hierarchy. Their tasks are much 
broader in scope. They are the key decision makers responsible for successful delivery and implementation of 
software projects. They participate and ensure that the proposal, estimation, and scope for a project is 
completed, build the project team, schedule assignments, monitor, review, and report project status, as well as 
manage project risks. To do these tasks, PMs need to interact with multiple stakeholders, such as the project 
team, clients, and senior managers. To ensure efficacious project delivery, PMs not only need to employ 
communication, project management, and leadership skills but also be versed in project-related technologies 
and business domains (Langer et al. 2014). A typical PM would have 8 to 15 years of work experience. 
 A.2 
In addition to incorporating the stringent quality processes that enabled it to be assessed at level 5 of the 
capability maturity model (CMM) since 1999, the firm has been assessed at level 5 for the people CMM 
(pCMM), ensuring that firm is committed to its human capital with fair policies that manage employee 
performance as a key aspect of its growth strategy.1 This stupendous growth in its employee strength 
necessitated that the firm put in place objective HR management policies that allowed it to improve 
workforce capabilities through in-depth performance evaluations, appropriate employee incentives such as 
promotions and human capital alignment with the firm’s strategic goals through provision of on-the-job 
training (Curtis et al. 2009).2  
A.2: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
In addition to the hierarchical Bayesian Model and the dynamic panel model described in the empirical 
section, to further demonstrate the robustness of our analysis, we estimate baseline logit and probit models 
for panel data. To account for endogenous variables such as performance, we use instrument variables; 
specifically we use the average rating of other employees in the same role as an instrument; this variable is 
related to employee performance but unlikely to affect promotion likelihood (Hausman and Taylor 1981).  
Table A.1 presents the estimations results from these models. Columns I and III show the results for panel 
regressions for naïve logit and naïve probit specifications; columns II and IV show the results for a GMM 
(IV) specification for an endogenous logit model (Foster 1997) and pooled model specification with clustered 
standard errors for an endogenous probit model (Papke and Wooldridge 2008) respectively.3 These results are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in tables 3 and 4 and indicate that as expected, performance is 
positively related to the likelihood of promotion. Similar to the results from the HB specification, we find that 
                                                   
1 The CMMI institute provides more insight into the pCMM model at https://cmmiinstitute.com/pm.  
2 The focal firm understands that investing in its human capital is critical for its growth and invests in employee training 
to attain these organizational goals. To that end, it has instituted a 26 weeklong, foundational training program that is 
mandatory for all employees who join immediately after graduation. This program incorporates courses that build 
technical, domain, and process competencies and seeks to make these employees “work ready” (Kapur and Mehta 2008). 
Beyond the foundational training, the firm continues to provide training courses to its employees. The firm has a 
dedicated education and research department to provide in-depth training to its employees. Training resources are made 
available to all its employees regardless of gender, age, or organizational level. In order to encourage their employees to 
take training as and when needed, the firm ensures that most, if not all, these resources are online. 
3 More details on the estimation of these models are available from the authors on request. 
 A.3 
women are more likely to be promoted. Likewise, we note that in line with the results from the HB model, 
the interaction coefficient between performance and the indicator Female variable is negative and significant in 
the two IV models, suggesting that women are less likely to derive commensurate benefits from performance 
gains in getting a promotion. To sum, the consistency and robustness of the results from these alternate 
specifications validate the hierarchical Bayesian model.  
As noted in footnote 9 of the paper, we provide a comparison of the model fitting statistics for these models, 
that is, the proposed model in equations 1-3 with alternate specifications in Table A.2. Our proposed model 
fares better than other competing models, indicating that accounting for employee heterogeneity is critical for 
policy and management decisions. 
Table A.1: Additional Robustness Checks 
  I II III IV 
Past Year Performance 1.1745**  (0.0244) 
1.2754** 
(0.0244) 
0.6667**  
(0.0134) 
1.2998**  
(0.0140) 
Female 0.1865**  (0.0474) 
0.0895**  
(0.0274) 
0.1067**  
(0.0262) 
0.0542**  
(0.0172) 
Firm Experience 0.5156**  (0.0279) 
0.4125**  
(0.0279) 
0.2987**  
(0.0155) 
0.0525**  
(0.0187) 
Experience 0.6125**  (0.0317) 
0.6137**  
(0.0317) 
0.3605**  
(0.0170) 
0.4422**  
(0.0256) 
Female X Past Year Performance 0.0342  (0.0483) 
-0.4192**  
(0.0483) 
0.0252  
(0.0270) 
-0.8143**  
(0.0295) 
Female X Firm Experience -0.0015  (0.0628) 
-0.1115*  
(0.0519) 
-0.0106  
(0.0355) 
-0.1451**  
(0.0259) 
Female X Experience 0.0670  (0.0669) 
0.0710  
(0.0629) 
0.0536  
(0.0374) 
0.1483**  
(0.0290) 
Last Role = Software Engineer -1.4847**  (0.0506) 
-1.8453**  
(0.0205) 
-0.8580**  
(0.0285) 
-0.5565**  
(0.0372) 
Intercept -1.3302**  (0.0256) 
-0.8302**  
(0.0256) 
-0.7821**  
(0.0141) 
-0.5343**  
(0.0201) 
Notes: 1. Column I: Panel Logit; model II: IV Logit (GMM); model III: Panel Probit; model IV: IV Probit. 2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. +Significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. 
Table A.2: Model Comparison 
  Panel Logit IV Logit Panel Probit IV Probit Proposed  Model 
Log Likelihood -11833.37 -45448.98 -11814.75 -42496.18 -10493.29 
AIC 23686.73 90939.96 23649.50 85012.36 21028.58 
BIC 23768.22 91111.09 23730.99 85093.85 21199.71 
 
